Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy is necessary. We present an analysis of firms' adoption of new technology and government subsidization policy in a Stackelberg duopoly with differentiated goods. The technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, such as training employees. There are several cases related to optimal policies depending on the set-up costs and whether the goods are substitutes or complements. In particular, there are two cases.
Introduction
Firms' adoption of new technology is very important for economic growth. However, it may be insufficient in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy is necessary. We present an analysis of firms' adoption of new technology and government subsidization policy in a Stackelberg duopoly with differentiated goods. The technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, such as training employees.
We analyze the following three-stage game1.
1. First stage: The government determines the subsidy for each firm.
2. Second stage: The leader decides whether to adopt the new technology and then determines its output.
3. Third stage: The follower decides whether to adopt the new technology and then determines its output.
At the sub-game perfect equilibria, the number of adopting firms decreases from three to zero as the set-up costs increase.
Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firms' profits, which is equal to consumer utility minus production costs, including the new technology set-up costs. Subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers, which are not related to the goods produced by firms. Excluding income effects, these taxes do not affect demand for the goods, and are offset by subsidies.
There are several cases for optimal policies depending on the set-up costs and whether the goods produced are substitutes or complements. In particular, we highlight the following cases:
1. Social welfare is maximized when only the Stackelberg leader adopts the new technology, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should subsidize only the leader, which is a discriminatory policy. (Case 5 of Theorem 1 and Case 3-(1)-ii of Theorem 2) 2. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but only the leader adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should subsidize only the follower. This policy is not discriminatory because adoption is the dominant strategy for the leader. (Case 2 of Theorem 1)
3. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Since adopting a new technology is the best response for the follower when the leader adopts the new technology, the government should subsidize only the leader. This policy is not discriminatory because the follower 
Related literature
Many studies focus on the relationship between a technology licensor and licensee. Contracts vary in terms of royalties, up-front fees, combinations of these two, and auction, which are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Kamien and Tauman (1986) , Sen and Tauman (2007) ). Kamien and Tauman (1986) shows that if the licensor lacks production capacity, a fixed fee is better than a royalty, and is also better for consumers. This topic is addressed under Stackelberg oligopoly both when a licensor has production capacity (Wang and Yang (2004) ; Kabiraj (2005); Filippini (2005) ) and when it lacks production capacity (Kabiraj (2004) ). La Manna (1993) analyzes a Cournot oligopoly with a fixed fee under cost asymmetry, and shows that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower-cost firm always has an incentive to transfer its technology. Hence, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be fully asymmetric, but there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
On the other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyses bargaining between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. More recent work analyzes market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et. al. (2013) , respectively, find a non-monotonic relationship between the intensity of competition and innovation. Additionally, Pal (2010) shows that technology adoption may change the market outcome. Social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition may produce greater social welfare than Bertrand competition in a differentiated goods market. Elberfeld and Nti (2004) examine new technology adoption in an oligopoly with exante uncertainty about the associated variable costs, and shows that if in equilibrium both technologies are employed, a higher level of uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product's price if the up-front investment is large (small). Zhang et. al. (2014) analyzes the effect of information spillovers with uncertain R&D outcomes in a two-stage Cournot oligopoly model where a subset of firms first independently choose between two alternative production technologies before all firms compete in quantity. Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2014) analyzes new technology adoption in a Cournot duopoly with differentiated goods. Liao and Sen (2005) analyzed a situation where an outside or incumbent innovator may use a subsidy as a negative royalty from a licensee with a positive fixed fee. However, they did not consider a government subsidy policy. However, Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) analyze government subsidies or taxes for new technology adoption in a Cournot duopoly, and show that if firms produce a homogeneous good, taxation is a better policy than subsidization.
Model
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly in which two firms, A and B, produce differentiated goods. Firm A is the leader and Firm B is the follower. They consider adopting a new technology from a foreign country. The technology itself is free, but each firm will incur a fixed set-up cost to adopt the new technology, such as for training employees. We denote the outputs of Firms A and B with x A and x B , and the prices of their goods by p A and p B , respectively. The consumer utility function is:
where a > 0. If goods are substitutes, 0 < b < 1; if they are complements, 1 < b < 0. From this utility function, the inverse demand functions of the goods are derived as follows.
The marginal cost of both firms before adopting the new technology is c > 0, and zero afterward. The fixed set-up cost to adopt the new technology is e > 0.
Assumption 1.
We assume that a is sufficiently large, and jbj is not so large, such that a > c 1 b is satisfied. For example, a > 2c and jbj < 1=2.
If jbj is large, for example, b D 1 (the goods are homogeneous), taxation may be a better policy than subsidization, a theme for future research. In this paper, we focus on comparing cases of substitutes and complements, with no taxation case3.
If a firm is indifferent as to whether to adopt the new technology, it adopts the new technology.
Case of substitutes

Firm behavior
Assume that goods are substitutes. The profits for Firm A (the leader) and B (the follower) before adopting the new technology are
The profits after adoption become
The conditions to maximize profit when both firms adopt the new technology are
where
This is common to all cases. The condition for Firm A is rewritten as
The equilibrium outputs are
The prices of the goods are
The firms' profits are written as
The conditions to maximize profit when no firm adopts the new technology are
The conditions to maximize profit when only Firm A adopts the new technology are
Similarly, when only Firm B adopts the new technology, the equilibrium outputs are
Comparing the firms' profits before and after adoption yields . However, we obtain the same conclusion in both cases. The sub-game perfect equilibria after the second stage are as follows: 
Social welfare and policy
Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firms' profits, which is equal to consumer utility minus production costs, including the set-up costs for the new technology. Subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers, which are not related to the goods produced by the firms. 
We see that We now have
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem. 
Case of complements
Firm behavior
Assume that goods are complements. Similar to the previous section, let we obtain the following lemma. 
Social welfare and policy
Similar to the case of substitutes, we see:
All are positive under Assumption 1. 2. e A0 < e 20 < e 2A .
Thus, we obtain the following lemma. We now have:
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyzed optimal subsidization policies for new technology adoption in a Stackelberg duopoly. However, sub-game perfect equilibria and optimal policies are not simple, and depend on the magnitude of the set-up costs and whether the firms produce substitute or complementary goods. In our model, firms' incentives to adopt new technology are often insufficient, and in which case the government should subsidize firms.
We assumed linear demand and cost functions, though would like to generalize the results to general demand and cost functions. 3. In this case, non-adoption is the dominant strategy for both firms.
iii. When non-adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm A and non-adoption is the best response for Firm B when Firm A does not adopt, neither firm adopts the new technology. b) i. When W 2 is optimal, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy, and non-adoption is the dominant strategy for both firms, the government should subsidize both firms.
ii. If e > e 20 , W 0 is optimal and no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy, and the government should do nothing.
